YESTERDAY AND TODAY OF PATRIOTISM
Patriotism is not a notion that functions in isolation. It’s one of the categories and notions that serve cultural self-description of the social reality, which, according to Łotman, every highly organised culture builds for itself. Patriotism appears in connection with the notions of fatherland and nationalism, which in our cultural tradition are different from national consciousness. In fact, these are three different aspects of one matter. Patriotism and nationalism/national consciousness are the attitudes that tell one to get involved with the imagined social reality and the element correlating to it spatially, i.e. the fatherland. I think that nationalism is a radical variety of patriotism, the one that requires explicit declarations and duties.
In the European tradition of the thought about national consciousness and its offshoot – patriotism, there are at least two schools of interpretation. One states that national consciousness is an outcome of a long process, lasting from late Middle Ages to the 19th century. The other school says that nationalism and patriotism, and, consequently, the sense of identification with a certain space and tradition, i.e. fatherland, is a young category, dating back only to the 19th century. In my opinion, national consciousness, patriotism (the sense of identification with a social organism and space) emerged first in the regions where strong and dominating national organisms appeared earlier. The culture predominating for centuries created the possibility of that kind of identification, therefore everywhere in such places nationalism and patriotism are visible.
It may be said that the old patriotism exists in huge, once dominant countries of the Western Europe as well as in Poland. Nevertheless, the supporters of the view that national consciousness emerged more recently stress that the sense of belonging to a nation is connected with the type of social organisation and economy. Agrarian communities did not have the need to build a consciousness of a national character as the sense of connection with the local cultivated space and vassalage to the feudal lord was sufficient. That is why patriotism appeared only in the era of capitalism. This view is shared by some, including Ernst Gellner, who expressed it in his work Nations and Nationalism. Gellner explains his ideas very adroitly, forgetting, however, that the existing superordinate cultural structures were of a class character. It was very often the case that within one of the classes (e.g. Polish szlachta) a kind of democracy emerged earlier and with it the national thought appeared. The sense of national bond, the need for such identification were therefore connected with the democratisation of the social system. Nonetheless, that did not do away with the class character of the nation as a superordinate organisation.
The Polish national consciousness is certainly old because the Polish nation had early become a szlachta democracy. What’s more, for the territories close to the eastern boundaries of Poland, Polish culture became dominant as regards nation, religion and culture. The notions of a Pole, a nation and a fatherland appeared early as affiliating and identifying.
All tyrannies require a different kind of loyalty than the sense of community and therefore they were absent from the history of Poland, an autonomous entity.
Once
In the 1st Republic of Poland, in the social stratum that was taking part in social life consciously and legitimately, i.e. mainly szlachta (specialists say that in various periods szlachta constituted 10 to 12% of the society) a deep conviction was born of the existence of a certain kind of union: cultural, social, religious. This conviction may be seen in the history of custom and literature. The rest of the society, in turn, stayed – as Gellner’s views would suggest – on the level of identification of an agrarian society, where the surrounding space served as a point of reference, therefore the identity was expressed more in folklore, local traditions and submission to the immediate “lords” or in the neighbourhood relationships. As late as in the 30’s of the 20th century Józef Obrębski wrote in Przegląd Socjologiczny that the people of the Polesia when asked to declare their nationality responded: ‘I’m local’.
The old, strong Polish state from the end of the 18th century lost its independence. Nonetheless, the control of three different state organisms initially did not change the bottom need for identification into any different identification than local. The enlightened strata in turn, who were very often cosmopolitan – I hope I am not expressing any historical heresy – came to terms with the foreign rule quite easily. There is an anecdote about the Bishop Ignacy Krasicki (the author of a famous hymn on the love for the fatherland), saying that when it turned out that the part of the Polish territory on which the bishop’s estates were located would go to the Prussian hands, he immediately went to Berlin to secure his lands. That’s worth bearing in mind. Then the national hero Prince Józef Poniatowski was an Austrian general brought up on the Austrian court, who spoke French and German better than Polish. That social elite, aristocracy and public officers adapted relatively easily to the new reality. A declaration was enough and one did not have to do anything more: no deeds for Poland, since one could well be an Austrian general. After all, the history witnessed various cases, even after the Napoleonic Wars and uprisings in the Romantic era when many officers captured by the Russians accepted the offer of military service in the tsarist army. It was because they calculated that one opportunity had come to an end and there was no alternative. So some undertook the new service, others were sentenced to exile. Those who agreed to cooperate were sent to the Kuakas mountains or to the mid-Asian plains. Even Witkacy (a famous Polish painter and playwright) started service as a Russian citizen in the tsarist army during the WWI where he served as an officer.
As is widely known, the 19th century in Europe saw the beginning of the ideological national movement. The modern notion of a state is connected with the French Revolution, since that revolution spread the ideas of freedom and equality across Europe and they came into contact with the Romantic attitudes in some part of the continent. On the Polish lands the emerging stratum of intelligentsia, coming from the poorer szlachta and the bourgeoisie, set itself a mission and a historic aim, which was to wake the national consciousness in the lowest strata of the society, i.e. the lower class. The project of a state of a national character is an idea that goes back to the times of Hegel, who used to say that the state is an essence of the national spirit.
On the Polish territories taken over by the invaders, the type of identification with culture that survived supported szlachta tradition. Also well known is the Romantic assumption that a great independent spiritual state exists – the true Poland. It imposed heavy obligations on the participants of a community seeing itself in such a way. Looking at this from the current point of view, those obligations were very hard to fulfil. One had to endlessly prove their readiness for sacrifice for the fatherland, including the sacrifice of one’s life. Love up to the point of death. This was the tradition of the East-European Romanticism, which developed into this special form in the countries deprived of their own state organism, like Poland.
In the traditional interpretation of the Polish Romanticism, the attention was directed to the Thyrtheian character of literature and the Romantic stand in general. This interpretational profile is present in the work of Maria Żmigrodzka and Maria Janion Romantyzm i historia (Romanticism and History). Maria Janion tries to convince us that the romantic ideal of experiencing patriotism in the Polish consciousness made it through the 80’s of the 20th century – the last romantic bid was, according to Janion, the first Polish Solidarity. There is something to it since the Polish intelligentsia from the time it emerged have undoubtedly felt themselves to be a guide of the nation. Being a member of intelligentsia involved not only a membership in a certain social group but also imposed obligations and a mission: teachers, doctors, scholars – all of them tried to fulfil the mission of wakening the feeling of national identity and patriotic attitudes in the whole society. Poets and writers where heading the movement.
Now
I think that the attitudes are changing only now, in our ‘free’ Poland, because the assimilation of capitalism has suddenly shown that it can be achieved without any great leading social stratum, which was up to this time constituted by the intelligentsia. The debate on the role of intelligentsia in the Polish society, ongoing since the fall of the Communism, shows that, historically, that role was of great importance, but is currently deteriorating in an odd way. It shows that the place of intelligentsia should be taken over by the so-called middle class, which, however, does not fulfil the ethos requirements of the intelligentsia , i.e. the idea of a mission. What’s more, it turns out that the call for service for your fatherland disappears under these conditions. Well, it is said today that there are many different ways of serving your country: you should accumulate wealth, live your individual lives, know how to govern yourself as a society. It is not necessarily against the loyalty for the state and nation. Deep patriotic motivations are currently useless so they should be laid down for some better times. One cannot live in the state of constant nationally motivated tension. Such a motivation gets inflated quickly.
Yesterday
The above judgments are best confirmed by the example of the People’s Republic of Poland (abbr. PRL). In the popular understanding it depreciated patriotic attitudes and the role of intelligentsia the shaping of the national consciousness.
In the People’s Republic of Poland, the nation got divided into two parts: the active participants in the social life of this half-free country dominated by the USSR and the passive spectators. It made an impression of a social resistance while it was only inertia, powerlessness and sometimes assimilation. Nevertheless, the group that decided to stay active and participate in the state apparatus organizing the community eventually put the society – and probably also themselves – off the notions of nation and fatherland by constant addition of the attribute ‘socialist’ to them. It was said that the most elementary sign of patriotism is to serve the socialist native land. This enormous concert of propaganda which lasted throughout the times of the People’s Republic of Poland, constant holidays and celebration, was initially given a working class character but in some areas, especially in the western and northern Poland, it was additionally stressed that such events are manifestations of Polishness. This attitude found its way even to scientific projects. Special scientific committees emerged which restored or designed new Polish names for the areas regained from the foreign rule, they sought the Piast traditions and were held as a proof of the fast proceeding integration on those lands.
That period of the ‘official patriotism’ put people off thinking in such categories. On the other hand, it was probably the only way to achieve general mobilization. The sociologist Stefan Nowak claimed that during the years of the PRL, there was an enormous social vacuum in the society. The process of identification was going on only in the closest family – neighbourhood circles or eventually on the level of national solidarity. What was lacking was the authentic internal structure, various institutions, organisations, centres of the integration of the community life. Those were all taken over by the state system and as such they were to fulfil the implicit function of social engineering. As a consequence, they worked badly and were perceived as such.
Was there anything else going on? The patriotic feelings were played with by continuously sustaining of the conviction that Germany threatened us. The propaganda’s suggestion of the expected German invasion was to mobilize the whole society in a peculiar patriotic act since, reportedly, we risked the loss of our native land due to German imperialistic ambitions. All this made people tired and unwilling to participate in any community events. Of course, it had been much more complicated than that. This problem is very well described by Teresa Walas in Zrozumieć swój czas where she shows that the community life in the People’s Republic of Poland – be it academic, cultural, artistic or any other – was going on against or despite oppression. After all, it was difficult to deprive oneself of any means of expression and active life.
Now
With the appearance of the Solidarity and the establishment of the independent Polish state, the tired society did not follow the patriotic impulse, except for the period of first euphoria. The wave of enthusiasm soon went down suppressed by the martial law and, actually, has never gone up. In the same time an incredible acceleration of civilisation progress took place. The information revolution made various boundaries within which one might enclose Poland blurred because of the new opportunities and communication connections, both real and symbolic. Today, one cannot turn a deaf ear to any means of communication from any part of the world, including Poland. Everything that happens globally reaches us via TV and the Internet. Any attempt at mobilization in the style of the Tyrtheyan canon ‘be prepared and ready’ does not work anymore. Life has become more pragmatic, e.g. in Europe, but not only there. That is why the model of patriotism that the president Kaczyński is trying to wake is an anachronism and can not find a way into this part of the society which is expansive, focused on career, modern life, changes and active expression of one’s personality.
In the same time, the notions of patriotism and the fatherland have become a tool that can easily be manipulated with. Just look at the declarations made by our politicians and the persuasion present in Radio Maryja. It is obvious that every social group exists because of some bond therefore it incessantly searches for the elements of that bond. If there is not any other form of identification because the awareness of the participation in the community life is small, the nation is the only point of reference that remains. And this makes patriotic slogans received well, but their roots are very short due to the commonness of their use.
So there is a kind of patriotism connected with the mass culture. It turns out that a selection of external signs or gestures which intensify patriotic feelings are enough. They are too illusionary, however, they go quickly up and burn out immediately. For example, patriotic feelings appear suddenly during sport events. It remains unknown why a football match should be an expression of the national unity, what’s more everybody is expecting that this will have some lasting effects while it is widely known that the sport emotions finish with the game. But sportsmen are repeatedly pressurised that Poland is craving for success. In such circumstances, the need for the national identification increases rapidly in such circumstances but it is sham, surface and blind. Take for example the presidential pardon granted by Aleksander Kwaśniewski to the common criminal Andrzej Gołota.
At this point it is worth directing one’s attention to anther important aspect of patriotism. In the old ‘intelligentsia’ understanding, patriotism and national consciousness cannot do without a mythology, which, from its very nature, must have its roots in very distant times. It is difficult to build a mythology of yesterday, though it is not impossible. In our tradition one period remains in which one may speak about the dominant great Poland. This was the Poland before partitions, the imperialistic Poland, the Poland with the Eastern Marches; that is why the Marches are still the point of reference for the patriotic mythology, the Marshes tradition is still being cultivated as a national tradition. It was tragically maintained by the WWII. On the other hand, the defeat of the Marshes was used to create the banner in a Romantic style with which we can all identify ourselves. So, the loss of the Marshes, all German-Polish-Ukrainian conflicts, Katyń… this is an incomplete set of facts that are understood as national defeats. On this defeats one still constructs a post-romantic vision of the national history. We cherish that past. Simultaneously, the society that is very mixed and not too well educated believes in that myths, with their mixed historic facts, mass projections, aversion and stereotypes. It builds itself some strange common imagined reality. During the field research about the national hero in Poland, I myself witnessed the interview with an inhabitant from the area of Dubienka. When asked about the Polish national hero, he answered ‘Mickiewicz’. ‘And how does he look like?’ ‘You know, in an armour with a beard, sitting on a horse’.
I think that the Polish patriotism is ill also because we still preserve the traditional mass conviction that we are special and our culture is supreme. We do not know how to get rid of it. The sense of superiority has its completion in the inferiority complex. In reference to some we feel better, in comparison with others we feel inferior. It may be an expression of authoritarian personality described once by Erich Fromm in his Escape from Freedom.
Tomorrow
The patriotism of today must be of a different character. Instead of the kind of patriotism that is based on a patriotic duty deforming personality, for me much more interesting and satisfactory are the loyalties of a civic type. Only then the dangerous trait of nationalism disappears. What’s more, nurturing of a culture can be a value of its own without the necessity to stress its national character all the time. When boundaries cease to divide, the only thing that any group has to offer is the cultural originality. On the one hand, it is diminishing due to globalisation processes; on the other hand, globalisation increases the sensitivity for localness. Glocalisation right next to globalisation. That is why all forms o localness should be supported, all ideas of what is our own and idiosyncratic. Let patriotism find its fulfilment on these basic levels. And on the macro-social level, the loyalty to the state is enough. The ‘local’ patriotism transforms itself very easily from the micro-level to the higher one. We speak of the local traditions that they are ours and Polish. In the community consciousness those local traditions do not break away from the feeling of historical, mythical and conceptual community. This localness – this is Poland too.
Until recently, patriotism was not fashionable because, among others, cultural anthropology and political studies have constantly talked about political correctness and multiculturalism. Some researchers put forward theses saying that in the case of constantly mixing population it is more and more difficult to talk about nations using the framework we have known so far. It seems that the pendulum is moving back now and the conviction that a nation constitutes some value starts appearing not only in Poland. In my opinion nation as a category will survive as well as love for it, i.e. patriotism; however, it will be very difficult to specify how it should function. It is easy to fall into numerous traps, which, in the Polish understanding, are nationalisms. The example of the wars in the Balkan area from 1992 shows where nationalisms can lead to. It was said after the war was over that not a small role in unleashing the it was played by intellectual elites instigating so-called national feelings. They might have well parted in peace. But the national conflicts and blind love for the fatherland (maybe there was no other identifying element) had grown so much that the war broke out, people wipe out each other and completely nothing came out of that, except for the killing. It is awful. Even though I might quote some anthropological interpretations that explain those facts, would it be enough?
I am of the opinion that nationalism and radical patriotism are notions that ill serve the social life. Patriotism only should be left as a paint for a different type of loyalty. Polish state is the state of Polish citizens – that kind of loyalty, if taken seriously, is enough. And in every place in which resentments attempt to dominate unnecessary irritation appears as well as blind, wrong identification. This is a dreadful disease this nationalism which commands that my private view of the world and my love for the fatherland be subdued to some common extreme love.
And truly, there were times when one was forced to choose. Those who know them are especially the descendants of people living in Silesia or Pomerania, where during WWII on the territories annexed by the Third Reich the only chance to survive was to sign the volklist. Those were dramatic and radical choices, forced on people by nationalism: choose! You are either German or Polish… if you sign the volklist, then you are German and will survive, but your children will be taken to Wehrmacht or you yourself will be enlisted as it is the patriotic duty of a German. But still, you have the chance to survive, you and your family. And if you don’t sign the volklist…you will find yourself in Stutthoff or some other camp. Those were final choices. Many years later those incredible situations became decisive once again when the Silesians emigrating to the Federal Republic of Germany (I won’t mention the reasons for such decisions here) were given German citizenship on the basis of the family books, so-called “familienbuch”, kept from the times of signing the volklist. How complicated situations happened to the inhabitants of the land that we call Poland today. And now an MP (a meek political player) by fair means or foul reproaches somebody for having a grandfather in Wehrmacht.
Let patriotism be a beautiful idea. Let it be a historical vision about the times that will never come back in the way Stanisław Vincenz and others wrote about them. Let it be nostalgic Polish paradises, prettily called so by Jan Błoński in his Polski raj. Let there be mythical small fatherlands and the love for the land of one’s childhood. Let they be Polish. But the awareness of other loyalties should be made rational and should not disturb our daily life. And there are societies where such a common measure of pragmatism exists. It is commonly regarded that things are so in the Czech Republic and that is why Poles stereotypically do not like Czech people because they do not try to square the circle.
Czesław Robotycki
Translated by Anna Skrajna
The article comes from the bimonthly “Dekada Literacka” issue no. 6 (220) 2006